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Introduction
Since the start of the 2000s, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) has become an increasingly important player on the 
Central Asian scene, which until then had been essentially 
divided between Russia and the US. Today, Central Asia’s 
future lies in its ability to avoid the destabilisations of the 
Afghan–Pakistan zone, and through Chinese influence, to 
partake of the Asia–Pacific’s economic prosperity. In less 
than two decades, Beijing has managed to make a massive 
and  multiform  entry  onto  the  Central  Asian  scene:  it 
has proven itself a loyal partner on the level of bilateral 
diplomacy and has succeeded in turning the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) into a regional structure 
appreciated by its members. China has also become a 
leading actor in trade as well as in the hydrocarbon sector 
and infrastructure. In examining the shift that China has 
generated in Central Asian realities, this paper focuses on 
the political and geopolitical impact of Beijing’s growing 
influence, along with the economic implications of the 
Chinese presence in Central Asia. To what extent will this 
affect  the  objectives  of  the  European  Union?  China  is 
one of the EU’s economic competitors in domains such 
as  energy;  it  obstructs  cooperation  between  Central 
Asian states and Western countries, and it encourages 
the  authoritarian  tendencies  of  political  regimes.  Yet, 
partnership and economic competition go hand in hand, 
as  EU  texts  recognise.1  In  addition,  the  EU’s  rationale 
for  setting  up  in  Central  Asia  is  not  to  compete  with 
neighbouring states, but instead to seek cooperation in 
accordance with the idea that a multiplicity of actors will 
guarantee the zone’s stability and its geopolitical balance. 
So what joint interest might China and the EU have in 
Central Asia? On a certain number of questions such as 
security and long-term development, the EU and China 
share the same concerns and Beijing is seeking greater 
collaboration with Europe. 
The political and geopolitical impact of the 
Chinese presence in Central Asia
Chinese interests in Central Asia have been structured in 
phases. In the first half of the 1990s, the concern was to 
demilitarise the borders, sign demarcation treaties and 
prevent the strengthening of Uighur separatism. In the 
second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, China aimed at 
creating a platform for discussion and mutual discovery, 
and  at  elaborating  a  collective  security  framework.  In 
the first half of the 2000s, it moved to establish itself 
vigorously on the Central Asian market, based on the view 
that economic cooperation attenuates political tensions. 
Finally, since 2005, it has been hoping to establish ways 
– still timid – of promoting the Chinese language and 
training  Central  Asian  elites  according  to  the  Chinese 
model.
The new states of Central Asia discovered their Chinese 
neighbour in 1991, at the time of their declarations of 
independence.  They  were  rapidly  obliged  to  negotiate 
good neighbourly relations with a country about which 
they knew little and which Soviet propaganda had largely 
demonised.2 Although China immediately recognised the 
independence of the five states, it considered that it had 
been a victim of the ‘unequal treaties’ signed in the 19th 
century with European empires, in particular the tsarist 
empire. For many decades, the tense relations between 
the Soviet and Chinese communist parties prevented any 
settlement of these disputes, which were thus bequeathed 
to the newly independent states. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the Chinese authorities, still under international 
sanction after the violent repression in Tiananmen in June 
1989, agreed to reduce their territorial claims to ‘only’ 
34,000 km2, chiefly out of a desire to secure political allies 
in Central Asia.3
Compared with its highly charged dispute with the Soviet 
regime, the 10-year period it took China to resolve its 
border disputes with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
seemed relatively short and peaceful. Initially, the Chinese 
authorities, no longer having to negotiate with an ultra-
powerful Soviet Union, had thought that their economic 
and geopolitical differential over the new states would 
make  negotiations  easier  and  procure  them  greater 
advantage – especially as the Central Asian governments 
were in search of partners and needed to find alternatives 
for the loss of Soviet subsidies. The negotiations, however, 
turned  out  to  be  more  complicated  than  Beijing  had 
expected. The Central Asian authorities, concerned about 
a future Chinese hegemony after more than a century of 
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Russo–Soviet domination, were not to yield easily. Having 
pride in their newly acquired independence, they could 
not be persuaded to give up territories lightly, especially 
as Sinophobe  feelings ran particularly high. Lastly, the 
threat of international terrorism impeded negotiations 
concerning the border demilitarisation and retarded the 
idea of future, joint border surveillance.
Beijing  eventually  signed  border  demarcation  treaties 
with Kazakhstan in 1994 (some of the zones still under 
dispute were settled in 1999), with Kyrgyzstan in 1996 
(here also, resolutions over disputed areas were settled 
in 1999) and with Tajikistan in 2002. It thus remained 
content with the cession of territories far smaller than 
those stipulated in its original claims. But the territorial 
areas it has acquired nonetheless do have a real economic 
and strategic viability, including access to rivers, subsoil 
resources  and  high  mountain  passes.  This  cession  of 
territory  was  viewed  negatively  by  some  segments  of 
the populations of the two first states, who thought of 
their  governments  as  capitulators  and  suspected  that 
the  Chinese  would  soon  lay  down  additional  claims.4 
For, at the same time, China has not hesitated to exert 
political pressure at the highest levels to block solidarity 
from developing between Central Asia’s Uighur diaspora 
and Xinjiang, a move whose real intentions have raised 
suspicions. 
With  the  border  issues  resolved  and  the  Uighur  issue 
suppressed, China launched a trade offensive in Central 
Asia and reinforced its presence in the region by investing 
massively in security and strategic affairs within the SCO. 
One principal concern of the Shanghai Group, created in 
1996, was to negotiate the settlement of border disputes 
and to sign in-confidence agreements concerning not only 
the demarcation of borders but also their demilitarisation. 
Quickly,  the  group  envisaged  extending  its  domain  of 
competence from the securitisation of borders to regional 
stability.  In  June  2001,  the  Shanghai  Group,  which  by 
that time a formerly reticent Uzbekistan had also joined, 
transformed into the SCO, the founding text of which was 
based on the common fight against terrorism, separatism 
and  extremism,  thereby  adopting  in  its  own  way  the 
Chinese terminology of the ‘three evils’ (san gu shili). 
The  SCO  has  helped  to  defuse  a  number  of  potential 
conflicts,  especially  those  at  the  borders,  but  it  has 
been unable to organise multilateral peace operations 
within  or  outside  its  zone.  As  it  was  not  designed  to 
be  a  supranational  organisation,  implying  the  reduced 
sovereignty of its members, it does not have a defined 
military  structure  like  the  Collective  Security  Treaty 
Organisation,  which  includes  the  sale  of  technological 
equipment to member states. It is not a military defence 
alliance like NATO and does not seek to create multilateral 
military  or  police  units.  Despite  the  establishment  in 
2004 of an anti-terrorist centre in Tashkent – the Regional 
Anti-Terrorist  Structure  (RATS),  designed  to  develop 
common approaches to combat terrorist movements – 
any  multilateral  security  dynamic  remains  embryonic.5 
Moreover, neither Russia nor China is inclined to disclose 
sensitive information about new technologies and their 
respective  military  complexes.  While  the  two  capitals 
do  not  officially  see  themselves  as  potential  enemies, 
traditional  distrust  and  a  sense  of  inevitable  rivalry 
dominate. This background nevertheless allows for the 
exchange  of  information  and  for  a  doctrinal  dialogue, 
facilitating  better  understanding  between  security 
structures. The SCO thus seems primarily a reflection of 
Chinese willingness to support what Beijing has called 
a  “healthy  Central  Asian  order”,  free  from  separatist, 
Islamist  and  pro-Western  forces  that  could  destabilise 
China.6
The extension of the SCO, particularly to the economic 
domain,  has  elicited  a  debate  among  member  states 
that reveals their often-contradictory interests. Security 
and  economic  agendas  now  compete.  These  agendas 
are obviously not mutually exclusive, but in the face of 
limited budgets, it is impossible to give both of them 
priority. China would clearly be the main driver of any 
sort of economic reorientation of the SCO, which it calls 
an opportunity for the development of the ‘Far West’ 
and the conquest of new markets. Given China’s booming 
development,  however,  both  Moscow  and  the  Central 
Asian states fear that they will fall under Chinese economic 
domination  and  argue  that  free  trade  zones  are  only 
possible among countries that are on the same economic 
level. Still, some sectors seem to be increasingly favoured 
in the multilateral framework of the SCO, including the 
establishment of a transport corridor between China and 
the Caspian Sea that runs through Russia and Central Asia, 
reaching agreement on the export of electricity, and the 
development of structures to coordinate the trade and 
transit of hydrocarbons among SCO member states.
In a little over 10 years, the SCO and its precursor, the 
Shanghai  Group,  have  been  partly  successful.  They 
have helped to ease longstanding tensions between the 
Russian and Chinese worlds, to put in place cooperative 
mechanisms  for  former  Soviet  states  to  discover  their 
Chinese neighbour and to establish a collective discourse 
on the common threats they face. On the geopolitical 
front, the SCO enjoys the international recognition that 
all the member states had hoped for, especially Moscow 
and Beijing. Now that this threshold of development and 
institutionalisation  has  been  reached,  the  organisation 
faces new challenges. In economic terms, it has failed to 
compete with the Eurasian Economic Community. The 
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which remain primarily bilateral, lacks guidance. And it 
has been unable to erase Russian and Central Asian fears 
about an ‘invasion’ of Chinese products. Only the energy 
sector, most notably oil, is recognised as an engine of 
regional  cooperation.  Sights  have  even  been  set  on  a 
distant ‘energy club’ that would wield influence on the 
international stage. 
At the strategic level, the activities of the SCO are manifold, 
but largely remain at the stage of declarations of intent. 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the General Secretariat 
and RATS, a lack of coordination among member states is 
evident, the desire to exchange information is restrained, 
the financial resources are far too few and the bureaucratic 
structures are weak. Furthermore, the absence of actual 
common jurisdiction in most areas and the lack of relay 
on  important  related  matters  limit  considerably  the 
scope for potential action. Meanwhile, although the SCO 
undeniably attempts to counter Western influence in the 
old continent, no country in the region wishes to pursue 
an aggressive policy aimed directly against US interests.7 
China cannot afford to be declared an ‘enemy state’ by 
Washington,  as  its  economy  is  now  dependent  on  its 
relations with the US. The Central Asian states seek to 
keep contacts with the West in order to counterbalance 
the influence of both Moscow and Beijing and to open 
up towards the West. Even with the rise of anti-American 
sentiment among Central Asian elites, all consider Western 
presence in the region to be a guarantee of balance. They 
agree that the exclusive, dual grip of Russia and China is 
dangerous.8 In addition, the SCO has failed to coordinate 
joint activities against drug-trafficking and to become a 
forum for discussion on the water issue. In spite of the 
call launched by Dushanbe, Bishkek and Tashkent for the 
SCO to mediate their water conflict, China has always 
refused to become involved in it. 
China  and  Russia  share  similar  geopolitical  objectives 
in  Central  Asia:  both  of  them  desire  stability  on  their 
borders, are concerned about the ability of the Central 
Asian states to withstand destabilisation (whether from 
civil war, Islamist insurrection, popular uprising or palace 
revolution),  and  consider  the  region  the  main  transit 
zone  for  drug-trafficking  from  Afghanistan.  Both  also 
reject the notion that the West ought to have any right 
to oversee Eurasian space. The political rapprochement 
between Russia, China and Central Asia was facilitated by 
the common struggle against the Islamist threat. Beijing 
established itself in the region chiefly by its will to fight 
against  the  Islamist  movements,  for  which  it  received 
positive  approval  from  all  the  Central  Asian  capitals. 
A  Sino–Central  Asian  geo-strategic  rapprochement  is 
also materialising on Afghanistan. For the Central Asian 
states,  Afghanistan  remains  an  ‘open  wound’,  which 
feeds Islamism, drugs and arms networks, and prevents 
the development of relations with South Asia. So long as 
there is no stability in Kabul, it is difficult for the Central 
Asian states to develop strong economic relations with 
India or Pakistan in the form of pipelines, the export of 
electricity  or  business  relations.  China  shares  Central 
Asia’s concerns and wants to see stability on its short 
Sino–Afghan  border.  This  alliance  permits  all  domestic 
political  opposition  to  be  bracketed  by,  and  indeed 
conflated with, the perceived threat of Islamism: China 
has backed the Kremlin in its wars in Chechnya, while 
Russia and the Central Asian states have supported the 
Chinese policy on Xinjiang. In a similar vein, Moscow and 
Beijing have contributed technological and military know-
how to help the Central Asian regimes fight not only the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
but also the broader secular opposition.
This  political  rapprochement  has  had  a  significant 
impact on Central Asian societies: political reforms for 
democratisation  have  been  impeded,  the  activities  of 
NGOs and civil society are being increasingly curtailed, 
and access to new technologies and to media such as the 
Internet has become more difficult. China is appreciated 
for  providing  technology  that  restricts  access  to  the 
Internet and software that can block dissident websites.9 
This  alliance  between  Russia,  China  and  the  Central 
Asian  regimes  reached  its  apogee  during  the  Andijan 
insurrection  of  13  May  2005,  which  triggered  a  harsh 
response from the Uzbek authorities. Western countries 
condemned Islam Karimov’s regime for its disproportional 
use of force and massacre of civilians, rejecting Tashkent’s 
official explanation that there had been an attempted 
Islamist  coup  d’état;  however,  both  the  Kremlin  and 
China  came  to  the  rescue  of  the  Uzbek  regime.10  In 
November 2005, the US was asked to leave the military 
base at Karshi-Khanabad, a symbol of Tashkent’s strategic 
turnaround back towards Moscow and Beijing.11 In 2008, 
Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s 
independence strengthened Beijing’s position from the 
perspective  of  the  Central  Asian  regimes,  themselves 
concerned about any modifications to existing borders.12 
If Chinese influence in Central Asia has evolved in the 
course  of  the  two  post-Soviet  decades,  China’s  key 
interests have not changed. The Central Asian zone has 
strategic value in Beijing’s eyes owing to its relationship 
with  Xinjiang.  Any  destabilisation  of  the  Central  Asia–
Afghanistan–Pakistan triangle could directly affect China’s 
northwest. Putting this issue aside, Chinese foreign policy 
is set to remain focused on the US, Japan and the rest of 
Asia. The costs of dislodging Russian domination in the 
region would be quite excessive by comparison with the 
modest advantages it would afford. It would also compel 
Beijing to become more involved than it wants to in the 
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authorities are aware of their limited ability to manage 
their own unstable national fringes, especially after the 
events of spring 2008 in Tibet and those of July 2009 
in Xinjiang. Beijing’s Central Asian policy has primarily 
aimed at achieving pragmatic results. It has managed to 
resolve the border disputes and to reduce the level of 
military tension along the borders. It has also been able 
to suppress the Uighur issue and to persuade the local 
political regimes to adhere to Chinese discourses on the 
struggle against the ‘three evils’ (terrorism, separatism 
and religious extremism), on the unity of the PRC and 
Taiwan, and on the dangers of Western interference. 
Economic readjustment in favour of Beijing
China’s  growing  power  has  not  only  had  an  impact 
on  the  political  and  geopolitical  situations  of  Central 
Asian countries, but it has also profoundly changed the 
economic status quo in the region. In the rapid expansion 
of  Sino–Central  Asian  exchanges  there  are  several 
strategies at play. First, by using a voluntary implantation 
policy in vital economic sectors, the PRC is seeking to 
consolidate its political influence in Central Asia. Second, 
it wishes to contribute to regional development in order 
to avoid political and social destabilisation, which could 
have domestic consequences in Xinjiang and slow Chinese 
economic  growth.  Lastly,  the  Central  Asian  states  also 
provide new markets for Chinese products – markets that 
could open up to the whole of Russia. Along these lines, 
the  Chinese  authorities  have  even  mentioned  several 
projects for merging the SCO and the Eurasian Economic 
Community.  To  facilitate  trade,  Beijing  has  vigorously 
supported  the  applications  of  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan to join the World Trade Organisation.13 
To  manage  these  strategies,  China  uses  multiple 
instruments  in  developing  both  bilateral  relations  and 
collective  structures  such  as  the  SCO.  Many  Western 
companies consider the states of Central Asia, with the 
notable exception of Kazakhstan, risky countries where 
investment conditions are unfavourable or unpredictable. 
The local authorities therefore seek pragmatic, foreign 
partners who are undeterred by the political environment 
and are capable of investing in large projects, as well as 
in  small  and  medium-sized  ones.  Although  they  may 
not be profitable, these projects can profoundly change 
the lives of the local populations that stand to benefit 
from  them.  The  Chinese  authorities  have  understood 
the extent to which poverty and the decay of the basic 
state infrastructure constitute key elements of potential 
destabilisation  of  the  Central  Asian  states.  Beijing  has 
thus played the investment card by opening up highways 
and railroads, improving electrical grids and hydroelectric 
resources, exploiting precious mineral resources, and of 
course developing trade relations. 
China is also one of the only investors present in Central 
Asia that attaches importance to the frequently neglected 
banking sector, which permits the Central Asian republics 
to  pursue  large-scale  projects.  With  the  exception  of 
Kazakhstan, the countries of the region have particularly 
weak banking systems. The Bank of China and the Chinese 
Industrial  and  Commercial  Bank  opened  branches  in 
Kazakhstan.  In  2006,  the  Kazyna  Development  Fund 
and the Development Bank of China decided to create 
a Sino–Kazakh development fund to invest in collective 
infrastructure  projects  worth  up  to  $5  billion.  Kazyna 
also hopes to send representatives to Beijing, Hong Kong 
and Urumqi, and to gain privileged access to the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. In 2009, a few weeks before the 
SCO summit in Ekaterinburg, China extended $10 billion 
in loans to Kazakhstan. Half of the sum is to pay for the 
sale of the MangistauMunayGas to the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the construction of the 
Beineu–Bozoi–Akbulak gas pipeline, while the other half 
constitutes a loan by the Export–Import Bank of China to 
its counterpart, the Development Bank of Kazakhstan.14 
Trade between China and Central Asia has been booming 
for almost a decade. Between 2000 and 2003, Central 
Asian  commercial  relations  with  China  increased  by 
more than 200%, from about $1 billion  to more than 
$3 billion.15 In 2006, Sino–Central Asian trade increased 
to  $10  billion  according  to  Central  Asian  figures,  or 
$13  billion  according  to  Chinese  figures.16  In  2007,  it 
reached at least $18 billion, compared with $21 billion 
for  Russia.17  The  trade  gap  between  Russia  and  China 
is thus reducing to the advantage of the latter, whose 
commercial development seems exponential. Taking the 
shuttle trade into account, China’s economic presence in 
bordering countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
is  already  greater  than  Russia’s.18  This  dynamic  was 
previously more or less limited to the latter states, but 
it now affects the entire region. Still, there is a particular 
lack of diversification in Central Asian exports to China: 
a quarter of Kazakhstan’s exports to China consists of 
petrol, another quarter is formed by nonferrous metals, 
and a further quarter is made up by iron, steel and other 
metals. Metals constitute a third of Kyrgyzstan’s exports 
to China, with chemical products and nonferrous metals 
making  up  20%  and  25%  of  exports,  respectively.19 
Conversely, Chinese finished products account for 92% 
of Chinese imports to Central Asia.20 Whatever the future 
may  hold  for  Chinese  economic  settlement  in  Central 
Asia, the region is bound to experience a reinforcement 
of its economic specialisation in raw materials. 
Sino–Central Asian trade mostly concerns trade between 
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thirds of which occurs with Xinjiang. Astana quickly rose 
to become the second largest of China’s trading partners 
in  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  after 
Russia, and it has already held the mantle of Xinjiang’s 
largest foreign trading partner for quite some time.21 Of 
the total trade, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan each have 9%, 
Kyrgyzstan  7%  and  Turkmenistan  only  2%,22  although 
trade with Turkmenistan is likely to grow significantly in 
volume with the future gas pipeline. The astonishingly 
low levels of trade between China and Kyrgyzstan as a 
percentage of the total trade between China and Central 
Asia can be explained by the weaknesses intrinsic to the 
Kyrgyz economy. This situation is likely to be offset by the 
development of transit, however. Kyrgyzstan has become 
one of the main places for the re-exportation of Chinese 
products throughout the rest of Central Asia. According to 
some economists, an estimated 75% of Chinese imports 
to  Kyrgyzstan  are  re-exported  to  other  Central  Asian 
countries. The extent of this commercial growth is such 
that  the  re-exportation  of  Chinese  goods  has  become 
Kyrgyzstan’s second largest economic activity after gold 
extraction.23
The energy issue is of course one of the driving forces of 
Sino–Central Asian economic relations. China is in need 
of primary resources and it is seeking to diversify imports 
by expanding its overland trade with landlocked Eurasia 
to  mitigate  the  geopolitical  vulnerabilities  of  relying 
unilaterally on sea-borne imports. The Chinese strategy 
for the purchase of oil and gas fields has been influenced 
by Beijing’s late arrival on the Kazakh market, with the 
effect  that  Beijing  can  only  acquire  sites  of  relatively 
marginal  importance.  In  spite  of  this  negative  initial 
condition, China has tried to develop a sense of logic in 
its acquisitions. To compete for Central Asian supplies, it 
has invested in fields in the Aktobe region and near the 
Caspian Sea (AktobeMunayGas and the offshore Darkhan 
site), and has become involved in more isolated fields that 
have the advantage of being located along the route of the 
Sino–Kazakh pipeline (North Buzachi, North Kumkol and 
Karazhanbas). In less than a decade, Chinese companies 
have  successfully  launched  themselves  on  the  Kazakh 
market  (in  2006,  China  was  managing  approximately 
24%  of  Kazakh  production),24  mainly  by  accepting  the 
authorities’ requirement that the state firm KazMunayGas 
be systematically associated with all activities. 
The general Chinese strategy is to connect all the acquired 
fields  with  the  gigantic  Sino–Kazakh  pipeline,  which  is 
presently under construction, and which will connect the 
shores of the Caspian to the Dostyk/Alashankou border 
post.  The  first  section,  which  became  operational  in 
2003, connects the Kenkiyak field to Atyrau; the second 
connects  the  pumping  station  and  railway  terminal  in 
Atasu in the Karaganda region to the Dostyk/Alashankou 
station and was opened in May 2006. The third and last 
section is to be completed in 2011, and it will increase 
the pipeline’s overall export capacity to 20 million tonnes 
per year. On the Chinese side, this pipeline is connected 
to  an  intra-Chinese  pipeline,  namely  the  Alashankou–
Dushanzi Crude Oil Pipeline, which connects the border 
post refinery at Dushanzi to Xinjiang.25 The strategy of 
the CNPC in Kazakhstan can be understood only when 
placed in its intra-Chinese context: the objective of these 
acquisitions is not simply to provide energy to Xinjiang, 
but also to the densely populated, maritime East China. 
But  Kazakhstan  is  in  no  position  to  supply  a  massive 
amount of China’s energy needs: the pipeline will secure 
around 5% of the total volume of Chinese imports – a 
figure that could double (to 40 million tonnes out of the 
400 that China will require in about a decade) after work 
is completed to increase the flows.
In  addition,  China  is  interested  in  the  gas  deposits  in 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In spite of the challenging 
regional  situation,  China  has  succeeded  in  convincing 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan of the idea of 
building a shared pipeline and jointly selling gas resources 
to Beijing. In 2006, the Kazakh authorities signed an initial 
agreement for the construction of a gas pipeline with the 
CNPC, while Turkmenistan signed an energy agreement 
with  China,  according  to  which  Ashgabat  has  agreed 
to deliver 30 bcm of gas in 2009 (with expectations of 
around 50 bcm by 2010).26 The CNPC is the first foreign 
gas company in Turkmenistan to gain the right to carry 
out onshore gas extraction activities on the basis of a 
production-sharing agreement.27 In April 2007, Beijing and 
Uzbekneftegas agreed on the construction of the Uzbek 
section of the gas pipeline, as Beijing and KazMunayGas 
did in July 2008 for the construction and operation of 
the Kazakh section. Scheduled to be operational by the 
end  of  2009,  this  gas  pipeline  will  have  a  capacity  of 
30  bcm  per  annum,  with  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan  and 
Turkmenistan supplying about a third each. The overall 
cost of the project is $7 billion – a demonstration, as if 
one were needed, that Beijing has no hesitation in raising 
the bidding when it comes to energy matters. The Russian 
monopoly on Central Asian gas will soon end with this 
Sino–Central Asian gas pipeline. 
Beijing is also interested in the Central Asian hydroelectricity 
sector. It eyes the region as a possible cheap source of 
electricity that could make up for the energy shortfall 
in Xinjiang. Many such Sino–Central Asian projects play 
a very important role in local economic development. 
In Kazakhstan, Chinese companies are constructing the 
Dostyk  hydroelectric  station  on  the  Khorgos  River,  a 
tributary of the Ili that serves as an international border 
between the two countries. They are also constructing 
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located approximately 200 km from the former capital 
Almaty. The Moinak hydroelectric station constitutes the 
first ‘turnkey’ construction project for a new station since 
Kazakhstan’s independence (other projects have hitherto 
involved upgrading stations built in the Soviet era). Astana 
and Beijing are currently discussing the construction of 
an electrical coal power station on the Irtysh River near 
the city of Ekibastuz. In Tajikistan, the Chinese company 
Sinohydro Corporation was in the process of building the 
Zarafshan  station  near  Pendzhikent,  but  Uzbekistan’s 
opposition has stalled the project for the time being. The 
firm is also erecting several electric lines in the south 
heading towards Afghanistan. In Kyrgyzstan, a series of 
hydroelectric stations has been planned in the Tian-Shan 
mountains on the border with Xinjiang. And negotiations 
are  currently  underway  for  Chinese  financing  for  the 
construction of three stations on three cross-border rivers 
that run from the Kyrgyz glaciers towards China.28
Meanwhile, China is progressively expanding its presence 
in  the  mineral  industry.  Central  Asia  has  significant 
reserves of gold, uranium, copper, zinc, iron, tungsten and 
molybdenum. Beijing is very attracted by Kazakh and Kyrgyz 
gold. In 2005, the China National Gold Group Association 
and the metallurgic complex Kazakhaltyn Mining signed 
a contract for a joint venture to exploit Kazakhstan’s gold 
deposits.29 In June 2006, China proposed the formation 
of a Sino–Kyrgyz joint venture in order to extract Kyrgyz 
gold deposits, 10-20 tonnes of which would be held at 
the Chinese Development Bank as a credit guarantee. The 
offer, however, was rejected by Kyrgyzstan.30 In May 2008, 
China followed in Russia’s tracks by becoming involved in 
the development of the Tursunzade aluminium smelter 
(aluminium forms Tajikistan’s main industry). The Tajik 
Aluminium Company (TALCO) and the Chinese National 
Corporation for Heavy Machinery signed an agreement 
for  the  construction  of  two  factories  in  the  Yavan 
district that will supply TALCO with raw aluminium for 
further refinement.31 China also needs uranium, chiefly 
to complete the construction of several tens of nuclear 
power  plants.  A  number  of  agreements  have  been 
signed with Kazakhstan, notably that between the China 
Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding and Kazatomprom for 
the supply of nuclear fuel. The 2005 strategic cooperation 
treaty fosters the strengthening of ties between the two 
countries in the atomic energy sector and mentions “the 
unification of more segments of the industrial cycle for 
the  production  of  enriched  uranium”.32  Kazatomprom 
will therefore be the sole foreign supplier to the Chinese 
nuclear market, entailing a certain strategic recognition 
of which the authorities in Astana are especially proud. 
The Chinese presence is likewise important with respect 
to infrastructure, where Beijing is implementing a two-
pronged  strategy:  first,  to  improve  the  border-bound 
routes  in  order  to  increase  cross-border  transactions; 
and,  second,  to  open  up  the  most  isolated  regions  in 
order to facilitate internal communication. Thus, Chinese 
companies are having a noticeable impact on the road 
networks.  They  are  currently  restoring  the  road  from 
Irkeshtam to the large town of Osh, as well as a section 
of the Osh–Dushanbe road. They are also constructing 
two tunnels in Tajikistan, namely the Char-Char tunnel 
between Dushanbe and Kuliab, and the Shakhristan tunnel 
on the road connecting the Tajik capital to Khodzhent.33 
In addition, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are 
buying ever more railway equipment from China, including 
locomotives,  passenger  carriages  and  goods  wagons. 
Finally, the seven border posts open for trade with China 
play an important role in the local economies and are 
starting to change the outlook for development in some 
border regions. Sino–Central Asian trade is for the most 
part in the hands of either large state-run enterprises or 
those of the Hans from Xinjiang (particularly the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps), or lastly those of 
private entrepreneurs from Zhejiang, especially from the 
city of Wenzhou, considered one of the largest centres 
of  Chinese  entrepreneurs.  More  than  80,000  traders 
from Wenzhou have established themselves in Xinjiang, 
principally at Kashgar, and half of these engage in trade 
with Central Asia.34 
What  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  Chinese 
economic presence in Central Asia? This presence is, of 
course, of benefit to the Central Asian economies, but in an 
ambiguous way, since above all else it privileges the heavy 
industry sectors, which are in the hands of the oligarchs 
and  clans  in  power.  Small  and  medium-sized  Chinese 
enterprises are rare, since the Central Asian market is very 
limited and the investment climate is regarded as negative. 
Only trade has given rise to private enterprises, whether 
Chinese or Central Asian, or joint ventures owned by the 
middle classes. Here too, this business benefits corrupted 
milieus, customs officers, the police, etc. Furthermore, 
the  Chinese  methods  of  economic  settlement  are 
increasingly  decried  by  Central  Asian  actors:  Chinese 
firms come with their own equipment and materials, and 
do not give work to local enterprises. Their personnel is 
mostly comprised of Chinese workers who live in isolation 
at their place of work, without much interaction with the 
host society, and the few locals who are employed are 
often submitted to appalling working conditions. So does 
the Chinese presence bring development with it? Does 
it  contribute  to  spreading  know-how  and  techniques, 
to training the locals, to interaction with the settlement 
country? Similar questions are being raised in Africa and 
closer by in Afghanistan, and the response is paradoxical 
indeed.
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Uighurs, Dungans and China’s Central Asian minorities have 
limited room for trade and their competitiveness remains 
modest. These cross-border minorities nonetheless play 
a role in the development of bilateral economic relations 
and in the cultural mediations between the two worlds.35 
The  long-term  implications  of  China’s  engagement  for 
landlocked Central Asia in relation to transit and transport 
will partially determine the future of the region. Chinese 
investments in infrastructure will enable the Central Asian 
states to escape from the increased isolation from which 
they have suffered following the disappearance of Soviet-
era infrastructure networks. They benefit from consumer 
products that are appropriate for their low standard of 
living, but which are also capable of satisfying the growing 
technology-related consumption of the middle classes, 
particularly in Kazakhstan. The massive influx of Chinese 
products will also give the peoples of Central Asia the 
opportunity to reassume their traditional role as a transit 
culture exporting goods as far as Russia – something that 
the  Kyrgyz  and  Uzbek  migrants  situated  in  Russia  are 
already starting to do. 
The  Russia–China–EU  triangle  in  Central 
Asia
The pragmatism of Chinese businessmen is often exulted 
by the Central Asians and contrasted with the indecision 
and  unkept  promises  attributed  to  their  Russian  and 
European colleagues. That notwithstanding, their view of 
China is far from being entirely positive and Sinophobia 
is  rapidly  growing.  Central  Asian  experts  express 
concern about the potential problems that their Chinese 
neighbour might cause in the long term. On a geopolitical 
level, the alliance between Moscow and Beijing in the 
SCO is considered positive insofar as it has a stabilising, 
supervisory role in Central Asia. At the same time, this 
alliance limits the foreign policy options of the region’s 
states,  which  consequently  struggle  to  make  their 
differing viewpoints heard. In the energy sector, Central 
Asian states see their opening up to countries other than 
Russia as a way of guaranteeing autonomy from Moscow. 
Concerning  the  military  domain,  Central  Asian  elites 
prefer to rely on Russia, which, in cases of destabilisation, 
is considered the only really possible partner, whereas 
fears of the Chinese military and secret services are on 
the rise. When fielding questions of identity, hardly any 
Central Asian experts can be classified as Sinophile. This 
is the case whether at issue is the interpretation of the 
history of relations with China, the Uighur problem, the 
question of Chinese cultural influence or demographic 
concerns.  In  more  or  less  radical  terms,  all  experts 
articulate the same query: How can the small peoples of 
Central Asia preserve their autonomy over the long term 
and avoid Sinicisation, whatever form that may take? As a 
‘civilisation’, China is perceived as being foreign, and even 
as incompatible, whereas there is still a dominant feeling 
of proximity and even of intimacy with Russia: compared 
with potential Chinese domination, Russia continues to 
be seen as the ‘lesser evil’. 
The future of the Chinese presence in Central Asia and 
its impact on EU policy in the region depends in part on 
the development of Sino–Russian relations. The Russo–
Chinese alliance in Central Asia is based upon very real but 
only temporarily common interests. Even so, it is possible 
to discern the contours of a potential rivalry emerging 
over energy interests on the not too distant horizon, one 
provoked  by  China’s  exponential  consumption  needs 
and  Moscow’s  preference  for  exporting  Central  Asian 
production to Western Europe instead of reinvesting in 
its own fields and infrastructure. This rivalry is also likely 
to extend to uranium, precious minerals and electricity. 
Similarly,  there  are  doubts  about  the  future  solidity 
of  the  Russo–Chinese  military  partnership:  at  present 
China  needs  to  import  advanced  Russian  technology, 
but  once  it  has  attained  a  status  nearly  equivalent  to 
Moscow’s, Russian suspicions about Chinese ambitions 
are  likely  to  greatly  increase.  Moreover,  the  Russo–
Chinese  partnership  functions  in  Central  Asia  because 
Beijing  wishes  to  preserve  Russian  domination  in  the 
region. China prefers to let Russia pay the heavy costs 
of military security and of guaranteeing the survival of 
unstable regimes.36 If, however, China were one day to 
decide to take up the primary role in the political, military 
and  cultural  domains,  it  would  likely  encounter  fierce 
opposition from Moscow. Within the next few years, it 
is predicted that China will eclipse Russian dominance in 
the economic arena. Indeed, China represents the most 
credible  option  for  freeing  Central  Asia  from  Russian 
political  tutelage  within  the  coming  decade.  For  the 
Central Asian elites, China’s rise to power is the mirror 
reflection of the forthcoming decline of Russia.
But do China’s goals extend beyond the economic domain 
and  the  preservation  of  stability  in  Central  Asia?  The 
Chinese authorities have no interest in visibly ratcheting up 
their pressure on the states of Central Asia. At any rate, in 
the event of one of the Central Asian states destabilising, 
of the Taliban’s returning to power in Afghanistan, of an 
overthrow of the government in Pakistan or of riots in 
Xinjiang, Beijing has all the necessary tools at its disposal 
to rally the Central Asian regimes to its side and does 
not seem to want more. Yet, this does not mean that, 
broadly speaking, China has no long-term objective in the 
region. Beijing is in the process of rapidly setting itself up 
in Afghanistan: to ensure its influence in the country, it 
has placed its bets on establishing close political relations 
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on  developing  trade  and  economic  relations.  China’s 
role is particularly noteworthy in the area of exports to 
Afghanistan. According to Afghan statistics, in 2007–08, 
21% of Afghan imports came from China. Overall, China 
has  apparently  moved  into  second  place,  just  behind 
Pakistan,  as  Afghanistan’s  second  largest  economic 
partner.37 Having become a new target for Afghan drug 
networks, China intends to become one of the key players 
in the Afghan game between now and 2015, regardless 
of political developments in Afghanistan. The chief aim 
behind the Chinese strategy of a large-scale settlement 
in Central Asia is therefore, in the short term, to secure 
the  failing  states  of  the  region,  namely  Afghanistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the longer term, the goal 
is to open the region up to Iran and Turkey. Beijing sees 
this region as a primer to develop a regional dynamic 
that could be extended to the West and which would 
open up the doors of the Middle East and the markets of 
the Persian Gulf; a Chinese revalorisation of continental 
routes to the detriment of maritime routes, again, must 
be understood as part of a long-term historical evolution 
on which the EU should learn to take a position.
All in all, the real losers of the current Russo–Chinese 
alliance in Central Asia at present seem to be the US and 
the EU. Not only does this alliance limit their capacity for 
action in the region, it also complicates political relations 
with local governments over questions of good governance 
and democratisation, and slows down the establishment 
of Western companies in the Central Asian economies. 
The  often-raised  idea  that  the  Chinese  presence  is 
of  benefit  to  the  West  because  it  unsettles  Russian 
domination appears short-sighted: although China does 
provide a balance of power, it is by no means favourable 
to Western political or economic settlement in Central 
Asia. On the contrary, with some degree of finesse, China 
has dissembled its policy of containment of the West in 
Central Asia by letting Moscow take the largest role. It can 
thus only be hoped that Western countries develop an 
awareness of their potential to generate positive feelings 
in Central Asia, and to endeavour to return to a region 
whose  long-term  stability  necessitates  the  presence 
of  a  third  actor  to  counterbalance  the  Russo–Chinese 
partnership.
Recommendations
In  spite  of  their  differences,  China  and  the  EU  could 
collaborate in Central Asia in the following areas:
On  the  formation  of  elites.  China  has  implemented 
scholarship  programmes  for  Central  Asian  students, 
principally  centered  on  the  learning  of  the  Chinese 
language,  economics  and  managerial  training,  and 
technical positions related to hydrocarbons. Given that 
one of the EU’s objectives in Central Asia is to contribute 
to the development of higher education, the EU could 
consider establishing university and research partnerships 
with  Chinese  universities  designed  for  Central  Asian 
students. 
On  sustainable  development.  This  topic  has  been  an 
element of the EU–China partnership for several years. 
The Chinese authorities are open to the argument for 
action and the EU has turned it into a spearhead of its 
internal and external policy. Beijing and Brussels could 
therefore consider setting up joint programmes in Central 
Asia on matters such as the formation of state organs to 
deal with the prevention of natural risks, epidemiological 
coverage and food risks. 
On  improving  the  transport  infrastructure.  Both  China 
and the EU are participating in large projects to develop 
trans-Eurasian  continental  relations  in  the  framework 
of TRACECA (the Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–
Asia).  The  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development  and  the  Asian  Development  Bank  could 
come together more regularly on projects for financing 
road  construction,  tunnels,  bridges  and  railways.  One 
of the major problems of these sorts of projects is not 
the construction of the infrastructure per se, but their 
commercial viability, which is reduced by burdensome 
levels of customs bureaucracy. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, the Chinese way of building infrastructure without 
any transfers of technology or training for locals is based 
on a conception of ‘development’ that is largely divergent 
from that held by the EU; for the latter, the chief emphasis 
is placed on the human factor.
On hydroelectric stations. In contrast to Russia, China is 
willing  to  finance  small-scale  hydroelectric  stations  in 
Central Asia, which create less tension among the region’s 
states and present fewer security problems in relation to 
seismic risks. These small stations can positively influence 
local development in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and hence 
form part of a response to the objectives that the EU 
has set itself, namely development and the fight against 
poverty. 
On border control and the fight against drug-trafficking. 
Beijing is greatly concerned about the porosity of Central 
Asian  borders  and  the  trafficking  of  acetic  anhydride, 
which  is  produced  by  the  Chinese  chemical  industries 
and  enables  opium  to  be  turned  into  heroin.  Border 
cooperation is often difficult to arrange in a multilateral 
framework and tends to work solely in bilateral relations. 
Still, the progressive formation of Sino–Kazakhstani border 
patrols could lead the way to developing collaboration with 
the teams of the EU’s Border Management Programme 
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specialists for the training of customs officers could be 
envisaged. Development projects in  Afghanistan might 
also be set up conjointly by the EU and China.
Conclusions
With respect to Central Asia, it will be very difficult for the 
EU to find areas of political understanding with China, since 
Beijing  does  not  encourage  a  greater  democratisation 
of the region. Also, some economic sectors, such as gas 
and, to a lesser extent, oil and uranium, constitute the 
core  of  Sino–European  competition.  Thus,  on  subjects 
related  to  the  formation  of  Central  Asian  elites,  risk 
management, sustainable development and countering 
the  landlocked  character  of  the  region,  Brussels  and 
Beijing share the same reading of the situation. The EU 
could consider, in the medium term, acquiring observer 
status in the SCO. The ability of Central Asian societies 
to withstand security threats is also a major concern and 
a possible area of understanding between the EU and 
China. Collaborative actions in precise areas concerning 
the  strengthening  of  border  controls  are  theoretically 
foreseeable, although the analysis of both actors diverges 
on some basic questions: while both China and the EU 
want stabilisation for the region, the former considers the 
established regimes to be stabilising elements, and thus 
provides them with support, while the latter sees these 
regimes  as  motors  of  potential  destabilisation.  When 
new political destabilisations occur, as in Andijan in 2005 
– and it is likely that Uzbekistan as much as Kyrgyzstan, 
or indeed Tajikistan, will experience some turmoil in the 
coming years – then the EU and China will find it difficult 
to make their analyses converge. 
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